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1 
 
 
The title evokes both sides of an important argument and the 
frame I recommend for seeing it.  The argument is between those 
who support and those who resist turning “rhetoric” into an 
academic free-trade zone.  In this issue of Poroi, Herbert Simons 
has renewed his call for trade liberalization, this time under that 
very rubric.1  In response, I renew and specify the case for a 
strategic protectionist policy.  This includes evoking the perils that 
await the naïve free trader, as described by Joseph Stiglitz on the 
basis of his recent stint as Chief Economist at the World Bank.2  
The worry is that the Simons regimen would turn rhetoric into an 
intellectually debt-ridden, third-world power in the academic 
world. 
 
 
2 
 
As Simons points out, the debate has been triggered by his review 
of a book edited by Alan Gross and William Keith.3  In the earlier 
round of controversy, I joined several of the book’s contributors in 
reply.4  In line with the old Quaker adage, “My enemy’s enemy is 
my friend,” our response reflected an uneasy alliance of disparate 
elements that, on other occasions, would have been at odds.  In his 
current piece, not surprisingly, Simons exploits some of the 
internal disagreements that had to be papered over to face the 
common foe of rhetorical globalization.  Here I break cover and 
write exclusively under my own name. 
 
 
3 
 
For didactic purposes, though, let me begin by highlighting one 
defining tension in our original response to Simons.  Perhaps this 
is represented best by comparing Michael Leff to Alan Gross.  Both 
defend rhetorical protectionism, but on radically different ― even 
mutually opposed ― grounds. 
 
 
4 
 
Leff draws on criteria of legitimate lineage:  Rhetoric is whatever 
can be shown to have descended from the classical tradition of 
public address.  As might be expected of a family whose members 
have bred freely over many centuries, there are many mongrels 
along the way.  Leff holds that it is possible nevertheless, on 
relatively strict genealogical grounds, to say that certain ideas or 
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practices are “more” or “less” rhetorical. 
 
5 
 
Gross would protect rhetoric by turning it into a kind of Kuhnian 
normal science.  This converts the concepts of classical rhetoric 
into analytic techniques that can be unleashed on virtually any 
unsuspecting text to produce a distinctly “rhetorical” brand of 
research.  Gross himself specializes in science, though other 
rhetorical technicians might specialize in politics, cultures, etc. 
 What these rhetorical technicians share is a set of tools and a 
worldview that takes the tools to be suitable for interesting work. 
 
 
6 
 
Notice that Leff and Gross each presume a sense in which rhetoric 
is “global,” yet neither accepts Simons’s indiscriminate 
(globalized?) sense of the word.  Gross may regard rhetoric as a 
specific set of intellectual tools with universal applicability, but it 
does not follow for him that every application is competent, let 
alone brilliant.  Formal training in the relevant paradigms 
normally is required.  Leff finds rhetoric pervasive in current 
society as a key component of the West’s cultural heritage.  It does 
not follow for him, however, that rhetoric is a kind of 
communicative aether, spread uniformly throughout society.  After 
all, public matters ― the classical site of rhetoric ― do not exhaust 
today’s interests and activities.  When it comes to public concerns, 
though, rhetoric displays a unique sensitivity. 
 
 
7 
 
Gross and Leff would sell rhetoric as radically different goods:  
Gross as expert research, and Leff as moral instruction.  But 
together they share a keen sense of the economist’s idea of 
comparative advantage in the marketplace of ideas:  What is it 
that rhetoricians can provide more effectively than anyone else, 
to turn potential competitors into customers?  As David Ricardo 
first showed 200 years ago, it is only when every potential trader 
addresses this question that effective free trade can result.  For his 
part, Simons simply fails to recognize the question.  Consequently 
his advice to rhetoricians seriously imperils the future of the 
discipline. 
 
 
8 
 
We can imagine Simons as leading a culturally rich but 
economically poor country.  He is trying, in effect, to persuade his 
people to accept the International Monetary Fund’s conditions for 
financial aid.  These involve the immediate removal of trade 
barriers, allowing foreign firms to compete with domestic ones on 
an equal footing.  The result is likely to be one more disaster of the 
sort that Stiglitz documents and, more important, claims could 
have been easily predicted.5 
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9 
 
To follow the Simons advice would be to enable cultural studies, 
literary criticism, and social theory to flood the market for 
rhetoric.  These would employ some rhetoricians as their agents, 
but most professional rhetoricians would struggle to provide 
cheaper ― less intellectually demanding? ― versions of what those 
other disciplines can provide.  The traditional, distinctive strengths 
of rhetoric would be left to languish in relative isolation and 
poverty.  A shrewder policy is for rhetoric to develop its domestic, 
distinctive strengths to the point that people from outside the 
discipline would lack the capacity and the interest to compete on 
that terrain.  Much of the task is for rhetoric to reclaim intellectual 
ground that it already has lost to its closest rivals.  This 
phenomenon roughly tracks the shrinkage of the public sphere.6 
 
 
10 
 
I do not wish to deny that a free market for ideas is a beautiful 
concept to which we all aspire. But it requires a certain social 
world for its realization, and Simons shows no recognition that we 
do not (yet) live in such a world.  Civic-republican ends in the 
academy cannot be achieved by banana-republican means.7  
Simons rightly detects anger as the emotional vector that guides 
the initial response by several of us to his review of Rhetorical 
Hermeneutics.  It is the anger that led Marx and Engels to 
distinguish their own “scientific socialism” from the “utopian 
socialism” of their fellow progressives. 
 
 
11 
 
Life on Planet Simons seems to consist of NCA meetings where 
professional rhetoricians tell heart-warming tales of resonances, 
synchronies, and synergies between their work and the work of 
denizens in trendier precincts of the academy.  Occasionally a 
leader in the field like Simons himself can get a few of these people 
― sometimes by paying them -- to share a podium or a volume 
with professional rhetoricians.  Nevertheless the surface dazzle 
fades once we consider the balance of intellectual trade between 
rhetoric and its rivals.  It remains largely one-way, to the 
detriment of rhetoric, and the Simons prescription likely would 
aggravate the imbalance. 
 
 
12 
 
The Simons arguments for liberalizing trade rest of a peculiar, 
pragmatist reading of intellectual history.  Before turning to their 
intellectual substance, though, I want to draw attention to their 
sanguine attitude toward the current condition of rhetoric as a 
discipline.  It exemplifies a deep problem that the field needs to 
address more systematically than it has.  Put bluntly, Simons’s 
training in rhetoric has not enabled him to make sound judgments 
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about the success or failure of his own discipline. 
 
13 
 
Perhaps the normative dimension most characteristic of rhetoric is 
defined by the poles of “success” and “failure.”  This dimension 
might be easiest to assess when an audience listens to a speaker 
then responds ― by applause, grumbles, or decisions.  This is the 
paradigm for public address.  Attenuate or suspend the paradigm’s 
assumptions, and it becomes less clear what counts as success or 
failure.  For knowledge claims in academic forums and 
publications, it becomes radically unclear.  In fact, the intuitions of 
professional academicians about epistemic success and failure are 
generally unreliable, mainly because their standards are 
inconsistent across judgments.  Sometimes they base their 
judgments on citation counts, sometimes grant amounts, 
sometimes student enrolments, sometimes “the word on the 
street,” etc.  And what are the relevant time frames?8 
 
 
14 
 
Academic administrators and science policymakers dispatch these 
problems daily with characteristic expedience.  Moreover those 
who study knowledge production from an empirical or historical 
standpoint know that this is how such problems are typically 
solved.  For that reason, they typically deny that talk about success 
and failure can ever rise above the level of preference and 
prejudice in the face of sheer contingency.  As long as rhetoric 
accepts this verdict, however, it denies itself access to a distinctive 
part of its own heritage, one potentially high in market value.  In 
the final section, I argue that the sense of “success” relevant for 
evaluating rhetoric’s performance is the capacity to turn mere 
things into public things. 
 
 
 
 Against Pragmatist Complacency  
 
15 
 
The most challenging arguments in the Simons defence of 
rhetorical globalization trace to Edward Schiappa, a self-styled 
“terminological Darwinist” and “pragmatist.”  I reach for my wallet 
whenever “Darwinist” and “pragmatist” appear outside their 
technical contexts of current biological research and early-
twentieth-century American philosophy.  In more extended usage, 
these terms too often license complacent assertions suited to Dr. 
Pangloss.  For example, Schiappa draws a historical analogy 
between the fate of the claim that “everything is physical,” first 
enunciated by the pre-Socratic philosophers, and the fate of the 
Simons Doctrine that “everything is rhetorical.”  Recall how 
Schiappa puts the analogy:  “Now, 2600 years later, most of the 
sciences are still informed by the general notion that almost 
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everything can be described as “physical.”  Where is the problem?  
When was “physics” ever in danger of losing its disciplinary 
authority?”9  Implied here, of course, is that the history of physics 
teaches us that rhetoric has nothing to fear from globalization.  
Unfortunately the history of physics ― and of science more 
generally ― teaches us quite the contrary. 
 
16 
 
The discipline that we call “physics” conceives physical reality as 
the result of fundamental forces and particles well beyond the 
threshold of ordinary perception.  Only in the twentieth century 
did it come to be the authoritative voice on what we normally call 
“physical reality.”  To be sure, articulated conceptions of invisible 
forces and particles can be found among the ancients; and 
certainly the great scientific revolutionaries Galileo, Boyle, and 
Newton took such things seriously.  Although these views now 
strike us as highly “modern,” they struck most ancient 
philosophers and early modern scientists as “occult.”  This hostility 
to the occult views of physicists reached its peak in the nineteenth 
century, when a combination of philosophical and 
phenomenological arguments (mostly from chemists) claimed to 
show that our commonsense experience ― of, say, the solidity of 
objects ― had to remain veridical in any ultimate explanation of 
physical reality.  The explanation we believe today ― that a 
wooden table is “really” some atoms buzzing around very fast in a 
void ― was held to be a non-starter. 
 
 
17 
 
There are remnants of this sensibility.  By the early 1980s, the 
occult entities proffered by physicists had already received several 
decades of experimental demonstration.  Yet, as a Ph.D. candidate 
in history and philosophy of science at the University of 
Pittsburgh, I ran across an “ordinary language” philosopher who 
insisted that relativity and quantum mechanics are “conceptually 
confused” because they do not respect the “facts” of our everyday 
experience of space and time.  We graduate students were told to 
tiptoe around the philosophical dinosaur until he retired. 
 
 
18 
 
The lesson for rhetoric is harsh:  No particular discipline ― no 
kind of discipline ― has a permanent lock on any part of reality.  
By this I mean something stronger than the rosy scenario 
envisaged by Schiappa and Simons, whereby the originating 
discipline (i.e., rhetoric) may later need to share authority with 
newcomers (e.g., cultural studies) who provide complementary 
modes of access to a common reality.  Rather I mean that the 
upstart disciplines may simply usurp the common terrain and 
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leave the old-timers with a stark choice:  imitation or extinction. 
 
19 
 
Chemistry has been applied physics for only about 100 years.  
Before that, it competed with physics to provide the fundamental 
account of physical reality.  Theirs was a battle of “energy” versus 
“atoms.”10  To the intuitive rhetorician, moreover, chemistry had 
all the initial advantages.  These included a tighter grip on 
common sense and practical applications.  At least in the 
nineteenth century, however, chemists worked in settings as 
different as factories and universities, with their status and even 
ideology typically tying more closely to their place of work than to 
an overarching disciplinary identity.  (It is not by accident in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions that Kuhn stops referring to 
chemistry after 1850.)  Chemists lacked the collective identity of 
the physicists, who insisted on a specific kind of resolution for 
scientific disputes.  This generation and explanation of phenomena 
in certified laboratories became the gold standard for academic 
authority in the twentieth century. 
 
 
20 
 
The physicists were hardly alone in doing experiments, but they 
argued persuasively that these were the keys to everything else.  
They succeeded in turning “physical reality” into an object of 
expertise.  As a classical rhetorician like Leff might put it, this 
removed the investigation and determination of “physical reality” 
from the public sphere. 
 
 
21 
 
To my eyes, Simons looks like he would take rhetoric down the 
route of chemistry.  Of course, it is a science still concerned with 
physical reality and still credited with significant practical import.  
Yet no philosopher of science has made a reputation primarily as a 
philosopher of chemistry.  This suggests that the discipline is seen 
to lack its own distinctive intellectual problems.  Chemists 
increasingly re-brand themselves as “nanotechnologists” in a 
desperate attempt to corner the grey area where basic research 
funding overlaps with popular science fiction.  The diminishing 
numbers of students enrolled in chemistry courses hint that 
chemistry is a word shrinking in reference.  People still believe 
that chemistry constitutes the world without necessarily believing 
that the world must contain chemists.  In this sense, physicists, 
molecular biologists, even engineers are all competent in 
chemistry ― and do more interesting things than the people 
officially called “chemists.”  Similarly it might be said that, in a 
Simonized academy, rhetoric would still exist but without 
requiring the specific ministrations of rhetoricians who are 
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distinguishable from other humanists and social scientists. 
 
22 
 
“Surely it couldn’t happen here” might be the instinctive response 
to my call to arms.  Don’t be so sure.  A folk sense of intellectual 
history peddled by people like Richard Rorty says that 
counterintuitive scientific concepts gradually come to be 
assimilated into public discourse, ultimately becoming part of 
society’s knowledge base.  Yesterday’s nonsense becomes 
tomorrow’s common sense.11  As a matter of fact, intellectual 
history is not so obliging.  It would be seriously misleading to say 
that the Copernican worldview has become our common sense.  
Rather we have learned to discount our intuitive views about 
physical reality, which still lead us to think that the sun moves 
around the earth, in favor of the Copernican view.  Most educated 
people now promptly assent to Copernicanism without claiming to 
possess any direct evidence for its truth. 
 
 
23 
 
For 500 years, society has ceded epistemic ground gradually from 
common sense to a kind of expertise strongly associated these days 
with physics.  Relativity theory and quantum mechanics are only 
extreme versions of this tendency:  educated people assent 
nowadays to cutting-edge physical theories not only without ever 
having experienced their distinctive consequences but also without 
ever having mastered their exact contents.12  Admittedly the 
consequences occur well beyond ordinary human perception, but 
presumably the contents are not beyond ordinary human 
intelligence. 
 
 
24 
 
What are the implications for rhetoric?  Look at the schizoid career 
structure of academicians in rhetoric and communication studies.  
At the undergraduate level, traditional courses in public address 
and technical writing still dominate the curriculum and often keep 
the entire department afloat.  These courses portray the rhetor as 
someone with considerable agency ― that is, someone who enjoys 
significant control over status, material, and audience.  Such 
assumptions befit an elite communicator in a contained space.  
This is a remnant of a bygone ― and perhaps lamented ― era, but 
it is hardly representative of the world where the students and 
their teachers live.  Luckily, at least for the sanity of the 
professional scholars in this field, there are graduate courses 
devoted to systematically dissolving just these assumptions.  What 
is asserted to the many in the light of day is routinely denied by the 
few at dusk.  From the Frankfurt School to French post-
structuralism, often aided by the latest social science research, the 
illusion of a solid public sphere with clear channels of 
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communication is revealed to be a dispersion of indeterminate 
media effects. 
 
25 
 
Sound familiar?  Certainly Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont had no 
trouble documenting the ways in which many of the French 
theorists taught in rhetoric graduate courses today have taken a 
free ride on the rhetoric that physics has used to establish its 
unique expertise in the twentieth century.13  Still my point is very 
specific:  that the discipline of rhetoric pays a high price for trying 
to follow suit.  Literary criticism, cultural studies, and social theory 
can all survive without a foundational sense of “the public,” but it 
is not clear that rhetoric can. 
 
 
26 
 
As I suggested earlier, rhetoric could turn into the chemistry of the 
humanities:  denying all intellectual pretension and happy to say, 
“Let us begin with some false assumptions for practical purposes:  
suppose there were a public sphere . . .”  Whether this is the spirit 
for conducting a public-speaking course is another matter, 
especially given the traditional moral character of rhetorical 
instruction.  It is easy to see why Leff might want to restrict 
rhetoric’s purchase to whatever remains in the public domain.  
How can you teach public speaking if you do not believe that the 
public exists?14  Yet another way to address this question, a way I 
prefer, is to have rhetoric reclaim the areas of life and knowledge 
that have been transferred out of the public sphere. 
 
 
27 
 
Before I elaborate this project of rhetorical reclamation, we need to 
consider one more pragmatist plank that the Simons platform for 
free trade derives from Schiappa.  In response to the Simons query 
about whether rhetoric should retain its classical vocabulary, 
Schiappa has taken another page out of the Rorty playbook.  “We 
use vocabularies that work for us, that accomplish our ends; and if 
there are other terms that work better for some reason, so be it.  
Disciplines progress (for the most part) through greater 
specialization, and that specialization usually entails a richer and 
more technical vocabulary.  If the language of classical rhetoric no 
longer does what we need it to do, or if other language works 
better, again, so be it.”15 
 
 
28 
 
The bland reasonableness of this argument suggests that 
something is afoot.  Schiappa sounds like he is saying that classical 
rhetoric needs to expand its lexical horizons, importing or coining 
new words to cover new situations unforeseen by the ancients.  In 
the context of Simons’s overall argument, however, Schiappa is 
really raising the prospect that the classical vocabulary may be 
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replaced altogether because other terms ― perhaps those imported 
from cultural studies ― can capture better what rhetoricians want 
to address these days. 
 
29 
 
Our images for “specialization” are telling.  The branching “tree of 
knowledge” comes first to mind.  By analogy, it would make 
classical rhetoric the sturdy trunk or perhaps the buried roots that 
support and nourish the exfoliating disciplines of cultural studies.  
But embryology images specialization as forming an organism 
through a reiterated process of cell division and reorganization.  By 
the time the organism reaches maturity, remnants of its previous 
stages have virtually disappeared.  The analogy for classical 
rhetoric would be grim:  ultimately the discipline will wither away.  
Ernst Haeckel’s famous image of evolutionary speciation, still 
found in high-school biology textbooks, superimposes 
embryological division and reorganization on the tree of 
knowledge.  Tree-like lines of descent from the panoply of current 
species stretch down into ever smaller and simpler groups of 
organic forms from earlier eras.  Yet this third image makes it easy 
to forget that speciation has been accompanied by extinction.  At 
most, the progenitors enjoy a virtual persistence, since today’s 
species carry most of the same genes.  By analogy, traces of ancient 
rhetoric as a progenitor of cultural studies might be seen in the 
tropes that remain fashionable in narrative analysis.  Is that 
sufficient disciplinary existence and recognition for rhetoric?  
Schiappa and Simons seem to think so. 
 
 
30 
 
The strict free-trade policy for rhetoric rests on an intellectual 
substratum of complacent pragmatism.  What should its troubles 
teach rhetoric?  At a minimum, pragmatism is a fickle friend of 
rhetoric.  Pragmatists usually dwell at extremes between which 
rhetoric flourishes.  Rhetoric demands an ability to grasp and 
compare alternative courses of action, especially in terms of costs 
and benefits.  No action is either completely determined or free, or 
an unconditional success or failure.  Rhetoric must appreciate how 
success and failure arise relative to exigencies and audiences, 
which the good rhetor tries to shape to advantage.  With the 
honourable exception of John Dewey, pragmatism has moved 
historically in a much cruder space of belief and persuasion than 
this.16 
 
 
31 
 
Early pragmatism was a philosophy of pure voluntarism and 
individualism, with William James appearing as the American 
Nietzsche.  Especially in his famous 1897 lecture, “The Will to 
Believe,” James advised that people should believe whatever works 
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for them.  For all its philosophical shortcomings, this version of 
pragmatism at least had the virtue of holding people responsible 
for what they hold to be true.  Recent neo-pragmatism tends to 
identify truth with what already has been shown to work.  In this 
spirit, despite his protestations to the contrary, Rorty often writes 
as if an evolutionary sense of survival were a surrogate for truth.  
Schiappa pursues this complacent line.  It encourages a profoundly 
unrhetorical ― and rather fatalistic ―attitude toward history.  The 
bare fact that some rhetoricians and their colleagues continue to 
be gainfully employed is mistaken for disciplinary success that 
requires no further explanation, let alone improvement.  This is a 
counsel of epistemic desperation:  “Rhetoricians wouldn’t still be 
here if we weren’t doing something right!”  Such attitudes mystify 
the dimension of success and failure that rhetoricians should work 
to clarify. 
 
 
 Toward a Rhetorical Reclamation  
 
32 
 
It might be true that those who can’t do teach, but it might be true 
also that those who do can’t teach.  That twist of the adage comes 
to mind with Simons’s account of his own practice.  He is exactly 
right to promote the familiar but relatively unrewarded skills of 
discussion and debate.  These remain at the heart of the 
undergraduate rhetoric curriculum.17  Any reclamation of 
rhetoric’s lost ground begins here, but it cannot end here.  As more 
and more of social life eludes the public sphere, his academically 
staged demonstrations become showpieces.  They are entertaining, 
even informative, for participants and observers; yet they do not 
connect to the sites or manners for the society at large to decide 
the questions debated.  In terms of the globalization metaphor, the 
Temple Issues Forum cited by Simons resembles a cultural 
heritage park or a wildlife preserve in a third-world country where 
the landscape has been blighted by foreign industry and 
commerce.  It can attract tourists, but it can do little by itself to 
build the country’s capital base for effective competition in the 
international arena. 
 
 
33 
 
One person cannot do everything, but Simons’s own measure of 
his pedagogy seems limited to what happens on his campus, 
whereas rhetoricians can do ― and already have done ― more.  An 
example is the Science Policy Forum started in 1998 by Gordon 
Mitchell and Timothy O’Donnell.  It began with the American 
Association for the Rhetoric of Science and Technology.18  Mitchell 
and O’Donnell, two experienced debate coaches, say they were 
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inspired by a challenge from a leading climate scientist to create a 
public debate on global warming.  The scientist wanted the U.S. 
Congress to provide the venue, but Mitchell and O’Donnell 
translated his challenge into policy resolutions for high-school 
debates.  They simulated the planned public debate, which 
matched leading adversaries in addressing a resolution that 
brought out salient differences in their positions.  The proceedings 
enabled multiple media representations, forms of analysis, and 
channels of dissemination. 
 
34 
 
The AARST Science Policy Forum shows how to reclaim rhetoric’s 
ground.  Mitchell and O’Donnell constructed a res publica from 
people and materials otherwise disorganized rhetorically.  The two 
turned mere things into public things, something only rhetoricians 
are inclined and able to do.19  Cynics may dismiss such an exercise 
as ultimately ineffectual in a political culture where issues like 
global warming are decided by legislators several levels removed 
from the rhetorical activists. Yet the very activity of constructing 
public things can sweep up large numbers of people and ideas, 
transforming them into a whole somewhat greater than the parts.  
This has been the traditional argument for participatory 
democracy:  not that it generates the best outcomes most 
efficiently but that it improves the society’s individual and 
collective intelligence.20  To mimic trendy management-speak, we 
might say that rhetoricians engage in “democratic capacity-
building.” 
 
 
35 
 
Rhetoric’s reclamation of the public sphere does not stop with 
this.  With global warming, the main obstacles to effective 
rhetorical activism involve the status of the activists as relatively 
minor players in the U.S. Congressional arena.  Rhetorical activists 
have a better chance of influencing aspects of governance devolved 
to state and local levels.  A striking feature of the United States 
compared to other developed countries is its disposition to decide 
educational matters locally.  To the rest of the world, the 
institutional diversity that characterizes primary, secondary, and 
tertiary education in the U.S. looks like the one clear case in which 
the invisible hand actually works.  Most developed countries have 
a national education ministry that sets a common curriculum and 
administers examinations for assigning students to schools at the 
tertiary or even secondary levels.  The lack of centralization in 
American education means that there are more opportunities for 
rhetorical activism.  Especially this can come in constructing 
locally binding social experiments from which others ― inside and 
outside the locale ― can learn, raising the overall level of play in 
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the public arena. 
 
36 
 
A case in point is a growing intellectual movement propelled 
importantly by the discipline of rhetoric as practiced in the United 
States.  Yes, Intelligent Design Theory is controversial.  The 
pervasive caricature of IDT as old Creationist wine poured into 
new scientistic bottles might leave rhetoric reluctant to associate 
itself with IDT’s “success.”  Yet there might not be another 
movement with such explicit links to the rhetorical tradition that 
in recent years has done so much to reclaim for public deliberation 
matters earlier ceded to technical expertise.21 
 
 
37 
 
From a sociological standpoint, it is not surprising that IDT turns 
out to be a clear success for rhetoric.  The location of rhetoric 
departments is heavily biased toward parts of America with strong 
populist traditions ― on both the left and the right of the political 
spectrum.  Moreover the authority of science in the United States 
links so closely to Big Money from Big Government and, 
increasingly, Big Business that it becomes an obvious target for 
populists.  That Washington still leads the research agenda 
(through the NSF, NIH, etc.) yet localities set curricula can make 
almost inevitable populist revolts over some aspects of science.  
Battles arise over biology textbooks because they are where Big 
Science impinges on our very identity as human beings. 
 
 
38 
 
This account of IDT ignores Christian fundamentalism and 
creationism.  As debates over Darwinian theory increase in 
philosophical and scientific sophistication, references to Genesis 
yield to arguments from probability theory and questions about 
species classification.  IDT has yet to score a knock-out punch 
against the Neo-Darwinian synthesis, but has begun to erode its 
credibility as a hegemonic authority on the nature of life.  As 
philosophers and scientists contest the latest versions of IDT, the 
arguments reveal a presumption that IDT must outdo ― not 
merely equal ― Darwin in the explanatory sweepstakes.  This, 
then, reveals a problem of epistemic fairness:  Why must the 
pursuit of science be defined in zero-sum terms?  Why must IDT 
supporters convert Darwinists to achieve legitimacy?  Should 
Darwinists enjoy a state-licensed monopoly over biology?  The 
presumption challenged in these three questions is probably the 
most pernicious legacy of Kuhn’s theory of scientific change:  
namely that the existence of a single dominant paradigm is a 
necessary condition for science.22 
 
 39  A more democratic and intellectually productive presumption is  
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that, where doubts remain about how best to explain something, 
alternative lines of inquiry should be promoted, especially if they 
would take what is currently known into significantly different 
domains.  The ongoing development of IDT may provide the 
template for further rhetorical activism in relation to science.  This 
suits budget-conscious times when research funds shift from 
federal agencies to local authorities and the private sector.  The 
rationale for such a reclamation of science for public deliberation 
may take the following form: 
 
 
 
Science is the publicly recognized authority on matters 
of knowledge.  
 
 
 
Yet scientists claim that a large part of what much of 
the public believes is not only false but also unworthy 
of public discussion.  
 
 
 
These undiscussable topics include basic elements of 
people’s self-understanding, even self-worth, so that 
the proscriptions impede people’s ability to function 
in public affairs more generally. 
 
 
 
 
Therefore scientists undermine the credibility of 
science as public knowledge.  
 
 
 
To implement a counter-strategy on a large scale could lead to 
what I call the secularization of science, a phenomenon analogous 
to the Protestant Reformation.23  
 
40 
 
The project of rhetorical reclamation is not simply about re-
seeding the public interest where it has been crowded out by 
creeping expertise.  It is also about creating new areas of public 
concern from topics currently submerged in the watery rhetoric of 
expert agreement.  Leah Ceccarelli’s work provides a useful, if 
unwitting, backdrop.  She reveals how major scientific research 
programs have mobilized cross-disciplinary constituencies by 
suppressing potential disagreements.  Typically the coalition-
builders exploit ambiguities latent in the polysemous terms 
significant to all the relevant disciplinary partners.24  As Ceccarelli 
shows, the Neo-Darwinian synthesis coalesced around just such a 
strategy.25  The reclamation of rhetoric requires that this strategy 
be made subject not only to scholarly study but public scrutiny as 
well. 
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At least since Thomas Henry Huxley’s 1893 Romanes Lecture, 
“Evolution and Ethics,” evolutionists have known that Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection fits uneasily with the ideals of modern 
medical science to preserve and extend life regardless of cost.  
Huxley, himself a trained surgeon, urged that medical researchers 
replace the evolutionary ethic of “survival of the fittest” with the 
ethic “to fit for survival.”  There have been sporadic attempts since 
to forge a field of “Darwinian medicine,” but evolutionary biology 
and biomedical science still differ significantly in content and 
orientation.  Even within the core disciplines of the Neo-Darwinian 
synthesis, old theoretical and methodological antagonisms 
between genetics and ecology continue to simmer, and they often 
come to a boil on biotechnology concerns such as genetically 
modified organisms. 
 
 
42 
 
It is always a mistake to imagine that a scientific paradigm like 
Neo-Darwinism consists of several well-articulated bodies of 
knowledge interrelated by the rules of logical deduction.  It is a 
mistake even for Newtonian mechanics.  A paradigm is little more 
than an extended exercise in interdisciplinary diplomacy, where 
the parties realize mutual advantage by playing up agreement and 
playing down disagreement.  An advantage of this strategy is the 
collective authority that the cross-disciplinary coalition can 
exercise. 
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In that situation, the rhetorician interested in reclaiming the 
public sphere must expose ambiguities, uncertainties, 
contradictions, and incoherences latent in the coalition.  Why?  
Not to sow scientific discord for its own sake or to delegitimate 
science, but to show sciences as more open to disagreement than 
they appear when seen through rigidly crafted Kuhnian lenses.  
The different fields of life science now hang together loosely.  They 
can be picked and mixed to form diverse research programs.  None 
need spell the end to “civilization as we know it,” and some can 
significantly realign the epistemic status of disciplinary 
practitioners.  The rhetorician is not responsible for conjuring up 
alternative sciences whole cloth.  But the rhetorician should be 
able to pose telling questions to scientific experts.  These should 
place their differences in open view and force them to offer more 
publicly accessible stories on why we should take all ― as opposed 
to just some -- of them seriously.  Since we cannot all become 
experts, experts must learn how to deal with all of us.  Such is the 
project of rhetorical reclamation.26 
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